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COMMENT
LAW FOR SALE: A STUDY OF THE DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW OF 1967
"Meanwhile the little community of truck-farmers and clam-
diggers have had their cupidity excited by the spectacle of
their northern neighbor, New Jersey, becoming rich and
bloated through the granting of franchises to trusts which are
to do business everywhere except in New Jersey, and which
are to go forth panoplied by the sovereign state of New Jersey
to afflict and curse other American communities. . . In
other words little Delaware, gangrened with envy at the
spectacle of the truck-patchers, sand-duners, clam-diggers and
mosquito wafters of New Jersey getting all the money in the
country into her coffers,-is determined to get her little tiny,
sweet, round, baby hand into the grab-bag of sweet things
before it is too late."'
"WHEREAS, the State of Delaware has a long and beneficial
history as the domicile of nationally known corporations; and
WHEREAS, the favorable climate which the State of Dela-
ware has traditionally provided for corporations has been a
leading source of revenue for the State; and
WHEREAS, many States have enacted new corporation
laws in recent years in an effort to compete with Delaware
for corporate business; and
WHEREAS, there has been no comprehensive revision of
the Delaware Corporation Law since its enactment in 1898
[sic] ; and
WHEREAS, the General Assembly of the State of Delaware
declares it to be the public policy of the State to maintain a
favorable business climate and to encourage corporations to
make Delaware their domicile .... " 2
The sovereign state of Delaware is in the business of selling its
corporation law. This is profitable business, for corporation law is
a good commodity to sell. The market is large, and relatively few
producers compete on a national scale. The consumers of this com-
modity are corporations, and as we shall see, Delaware, like any other
SLittle Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 33 Am. L. REv.
418, 419 (1899).
2 Laxv of December 31, 1963, v. 54, ch. 218 [1963] Del. Laws 724.
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good businessman, tries to give the consumer what he wants. In
fact, those who will buy the product are not only consulted about their
preferences, but are also allowed to design the product and run
the factory.
Delaware from time to time redesigns and improves its product
to keep ahead of the competition. In 1963, Delaware felt compelled to
do just that. The second passage quoted above is the preamble to a
statute appropriating $25,000 to study and recommend revisions to
Delaware's corporation law. This Comment will describe the process
used to redesign the law, and discuss some of the features of the finished
product. Finally, the Comment will evaluate the consequences of the
revision for the "non-consumer" public.
I. HISTORY OF THE PRODUCT
In the early nineteenth century, the process by which a corporation
was formed began to shift from incorporation by special act of legis-
lature to incorporation under general laws; New York passed the first
such law in 1811. 3 Incorporation under a general law rather than
by special act was at first optional, but constitutional modification
gradually made it mandatory. Delaware, in its Constitution of 1897,
became the thirty-fifth state to adopt such a requirement.4 Most
statutes of that period contain restrictions on corporate organization;
the Delaware statute of 1871, for example, applied only to companies
drying, canning, manufacturing and preparing fruits and other products
of Delaware, and limited its capital to a minimum of $10,000 and a
maximum of $100,000.,
In 1898, a special session of the Delaware legislature was called
to draft a new corporation law. A bill providing, inter alia, that fifty
per cent of a corporation's capital stock had to be paid in before the
corporation could start business and that shareholders would be liable
for assessment for up to double the par value of their stock was con-
sidered and defeated.' After this, in the interval between the special
session of 1898 and the regular session of 1899, "the present com-
petitive incorporation policy of Delaware was formulated." '
A group consisting of a financial editor of a New York newspaper,
a New York lawyer, and two Dover (Delaware) lawyers formed an
unofficial committee to draw up a "liberal" bill 8 and pilot it through
the legislature. The Dover lawyers planned to organize a company to
do the work entailed in incorporating and to provide corporations with
resident agents for service of process; the New York members thought
3R. LARcOm, THE DELAWARE CORPORATIOI 1 (1937).4 See DEL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1; R. LAxcom, supra note 3, at 3.
5 Law of March 21, 1871, v. 14, ch. 152 [1874] Del. Laws 380 (repealed 1875).
oSee R. LAxcom-, supra note 3, at 8.
7Id. 9.
8 A "liberal" corporation law is one containing a maximum number of enabling
provisions and fettering the corporation with a minimum number of responsibilities to,
for example, its creditors, its shareholders, and the public.
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they could get business for the new company because of their Wall
Street contacts.0 Their new company would have to have a good
product to sell; since New Jersey was then the most successful of the
states actively competing in the incorporating business, the framers of
the Delaware law patterned their statute after New Jersey's. By adopt-
ing much of the wording of the New Jersey statute, they could insure
some certainty in judicial construction,1 ° a valuable selling point.1 -
Since it is also good business to undersell your competitors, "[a] nother
important device by which the draftsmen of the Delaware law hoped
to attract the incorporating business was low corporate taxes." :2 Com-
parative figures indicate that Delaware's taxes were set a bit lower
than New Jersey's in all respects.'
3
"The revenue possibilities of the new law became the dominant
consideration," 14 and the draftsmen were successful in convincing the
legislature of the merits of a liberal bill. Whatever conservatives were
left over from 1898 apparently changed their minds, for this bill was
passed in 1899 without a dissenting vote in the House.' After 1915,
with the passage in New Jersey of Governor Woodrow Wilson's more
restrictive "Seven Sisters Acts," 16 the number of corporations chartered
in Delaware began to grow considerably." During thirty of the thirty-
four years from 1899 to 1933, corporation revenues comprised at least
twenty per cent of Delaware's total revenues; for twenty-three of the
thirty-four years, they comprised twenty-five per cent or more.'" Dela-
ware was doing well.
II. DRAFTING AND PASSING THE 1967 STATUTE
The three groups responsible for the 1899 law are still active in
shaping Delaware's corporation law. They are the corporation service
companies, which have grown considerably since their inception in
1899; 19 the legislature, which seems to have become more docile; 20
and the Delaware bar, which consists of approximately 500 lawyers,
about 425 of whom practice in Wilmington." Approximately twenty-
9 See R. LARcom, spra note 3, citing J. Wolcott, The Development of the Dela-
ware Corporation, unpublished thesis submitted to Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration (no date).
'o See R. LARcoa, supra note 3, at 25-26.
."-See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
1
2 R. LARcom, stpra note 3, at 17.
13 See id. 17-20.
14 Id. 9-10.
15 Id. 9.
16 Law of February 19, 1913, ch. 18, [1913] N.J. Laws 32 (repealed 1917).
17 See R. LARcom, supra note 3, at 155.
18 See id. 168-69.
19 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
20 See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
2 1 See 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY 689-99 (1969).
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five of these Wilmington lawyers comprise the full-time corporate bar.22
It is a very friendly bar, considered by outsiders to be quite competent
in dealing with the Delaware corporation law,'3 and headed by three
firms-Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Richards, Layton & Finger,
and Potter, Anderson & Corroon. 4
The 1963 statute calling for a revision of Delaware's corporation
law empowered the Secretary of State, Elisha Dukes, to spend the
appropriated money "for consultants and assistance in such manner as
will, in his discretion, most expeditiously accomplish" the revision.2 5
He decided to form the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Com-
mission, made up of himself and nine others.
The Chairman was Clarence A. Southerland, former Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court and of counsel to Potter, Anderson &
Corroon; he was only moderately active because of poor health. 6 The
Vice Chairman was Richard F. Corroon, a partner in the same firm
and one of the Commission's three most active members. He was first
admitted to the New York Bar in 1939, not becoming a member of the
Delaware Bar until 1946, and he still maintains membership in the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. 7 Martindale-Hubbell
lists some of his firm's clients: Penn Central Railroad, Corporation
Trust Co. (a corporation service company), Prudential Life Insurance
Company, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and the Insurance
Company of North America."
The other two most active members were S. Samuel Arsht, a
partner in Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, and Henry M. Canby,
a partner in Richards, Layton & Finger. Arsht was First Vice Presi-
dent of the Delaware Bar Association from 1961 to 1963 and main-
tains membership in the American Law Institute and the American
Judicature Society. His firm's clients include Allis-Chalmers,
Christiana Securities, Coca-Cola, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
Ford Motor Co., International Latex Corp., Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., Texaco, United Air Lines, United States Steel,
Warner Bros.-Seven Arts Ltd.29 Canby was Arsht's successor as
22 Interview with Irving Morris, Esq., in Wilmington, Delaware, July 25, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Morris Interview].
23 This is the judgment of Willard P. Scott, Esq., Chairman of the American
Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws. Interview, in New York City, July
22, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Scott Interview].
24 Id.
25Law of December 31, 1963, v. 54, ch. 218, [1963] Del. Laws 725.
26Interview with Professor Ernest L. Folk, III, in Charlottesville, Virginia,
July 2, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Folk Interview]. The names of the Commission
members were furnished by Professor Folk.





President of the Delaware Bar Association, and his firm's clients include
General Motors, Aetna Group, Getty Oil and Shell Oil."
A somewhat less active member was Irving Morris, a partner in
the Wilmington firm of Cohen & Morris. Morris was a Deputy
Attorney General of Delaware in 1955 and was Vice President of the
Delaware Bar Association from 1954 to 1958.31 He was on the
Commission in his capacity as a plaintiff's lawyer, since he handles a
large percentage of the derivative suits brought in Delaware. The
corporation service companies were also represented by Alfred Jervis,
manager of the Delaware Office of the Corporation Trust Company
and David H. Jackman, President of the United States Corporation
Company of New York. Jackman was the only non-Delawarian on the
Commission and felt that he should have been excluded for that reason,
but Secretary of State Dukes insisted. 2 He was there not only to
represent the viewpoint of the corporation service companies, but also
to give the viewpoint of the New Yorkers interested in Delaware's
corporation law. 3 Rounding out the Commission were Daniel L.
Herrmann, who later resigned to join the Delaware Supreme Court,"
and Mrs. Margaret Storey, then head of the Corporation Department
in the Secretary of State's office and now Executive Vice President
of the Corporation Service Company.
After the Commission was chosen, it was necessary to choose a
Reporter. Ernest L. Folk, III, then Professor of Law at the University
of North Carolina and now at the University of Virginia, was recom-
mended by Collins J. Seitz, then Chancellor of Delaware's Court of
Chancery.3 ' Professor Folk had already served as Reporter for South
Carolina's corporation law revision 36 and describes himself as being
pro-management, although not rabidly so.3
7  He was interviewed by
3od. 1782B-83B; see note 121 infra.
1 Id. 1769B.
32 Interview with David H. Jackman, in'New York City, July 19, 1968 [herein-
after cited as Jackman Interview].
83/'d.
34 He was replaced by Clair J. Killoran, Esq., on February 10, 1965.
35 Interview with Richard F. Corroon, Esq., in Wilmington, Delaware, July 25,
1968 [hereinafter cited as Corroon Interview].
Judge Seitz was a man not without influence in Delaware and has since stepped
up to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He was very popular with the Delaware
Bar and the opinions he wrote in his 16 years on the bench were highly influential
in shaping Delaware corporation law. When he appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee for approval, James M. Tunnell, Chairman of the Delaware State Bar
Association Committee on Judicial Appointments, testified: ". . . I do not have to
tell anybody that we have a lot of lawyers in Delaware who would not mind being
on the circuit bench .... But nevertheless, they were suppressed .... We had the
unique experience of having the Bar stand shoulder-to-shoulder unanimously in support
of Chancellor Seitz." Hearings Before Subcomm. of Comm. on the Judiciary of the
Senate, Nomination of Collins J. Seitz of Delaware to be United States Circuit Judge,
Third Circuit, Vice John Biggs, Jr., retired, April 5, 1966 19-20 (unpublished; on
file at Senate Judiciary Committee Office, Washington, D.C.).
SO E. FOLKc, THE Namv DELAWARE CORPORATION LAw vi (1967).
37Folk Interview, supra note 26.
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the Commission in March of 1964; 38 at its third meeting, on March
20, the Commission approved him, with only Jervis dissenting."9
Folk's assignment states, rather blatantly, the goal of the revision:
"1. To take an overall survey of the statute so there would be no
conflict between various sections; 2. To ascertain what other states
have to attract corporations that we do not have; 3. What his recom-
mendations would be for amending the law." 40 Completion date was
set for September 1, 1964,"' in the hope that "any amendments could
be introduced at the next session of the legislature." 42
Several decisions were made quickly. The first problem was
whether to scrap the existing statute and start over again or simply to
amend and revise the present one. Arsht, possibly as a joke, suggested
the use of Israel's statute as a model, since it is very simple, but Chief
Justice Southerland evidently did not like the idea.43  The Commission
decided to preserve as much of the present wording as possible so as
to keep the body of precedents that had been built up over the years.'
This is not, of course, an unsound decision for a legislative draftsman
to make. Statutes should be written to make their meaning as clear
as possible, and using phrases which have already been interpreted
furthers this goal. But the decision not to scrap the existing statute
may have been made with other considerations in mind. A wealth of
judicial decisions helps Delaware attract corporations; ' to do away
with this body of precedent could very well lessen Delaware's salability.
Thus the "comprehensive revision" of an 1899 bill began by rejecting
thorough change of what can only be termed a tortured statute.46
Delaware began its business by borrowing New Jersey's wording so as
to insure settled judicial interpretation, and it was not about to tamper
lightly with part of the formula for its success.
For a similar reason, it was also decided that the revision should
not follow the Model Act. 47  The reason was stated simply by Mr.
Jackman, President of the United States Corporation Company, who
"emphasized that Delaware should not adopt the Model Act because we
38 Id.
39 See Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 3d
meeting, March 20, 1964, at 1 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell,
Wilmington, Delaware).
4o Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 2d meeting,
February 25, 1964, at 2 (emphasis added) (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht
& Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
41Minutes 3/20/64, supra note 39, at 2.
42Minutes 2/25/64, supra note 40, at 2.
43 Folk Interview, vtpra note 26.
441d. Since this has resulted in a statute which does not "read modern," Professor
Folk thinks that some people believe the drafting job was not done properly, a
criticism he feels to be unwarranted. Id.
45 Jackman Interview, supra note 32. See text accompanying notes 243-46 infra.
46 See text accompanying note 82 infra.
47 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT (1966).
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do not want to be a 'me too' state in view of the fact that in the past
most of the other States had copied our laws and that we should be
a leader not a follower." 48
It was then time to find out what the consumers might have to
say. Or, more accurately, to find out what other consumers had to
say, since the members of the Commission producing the law would
also be using the finished product. Form letters were sent out, advising
the recipient that a revision was in progress and soliciting comments
on possible changes. 9 Jackman wanted the letter "to publicize the
serious effort being made to attract corporations"."0  Judge Herrmann
suggested that the letter advise law firms "of the reasonableness of
Delaware taxes and fees applicable to corporations." "' Professor Folk
felt that the choice of recipients was not made on a systematic basis.
"Essentially it boiled down to picking various firms which have had
substantial contacts with Delaware and which have, of course, em-
ployed Delaware counsel to handle local litigations or other problems
relating to the Delaware law." "2 Irving Morris suggested that three
New York plaintiff's firms be sent letters: Pomerantz Levy Haudek
& Block, Shea, Gallop, Climenko & Gould, and Milton Paulson." It is
not known whether letters were ever sent to these firms, but no replies
were ever received from them." Professor Folk observes that the
lack of replies "reflects the fact that inevitably the drafting of the cor-
poration law is aimed at the interests of the corporations themselves." 55
About 125 replies were received, although Professor Folk does not
feel that they helped him significantly. 0  Among the firms replying
were Monroe & Lemann, New Orleans; White & Case, New York;
General Foods Corporation; Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll,
Philadelphia; Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia; Cahill, Gordon,
Reindel & Ohl, New York; Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis; Johnson,
Bromberg, Ledes & Riggs, Dallas; Cummings & Lockwood, Stanford;
and Deutsch, Garrington & Styl, New Orleans."
In addition to answering the form letters, lawyers sometimes in-
quired about specific provisions and a proposed draft would be sent
48 Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 4th meeting,
July 14, 1964, at 2-3 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wil-
mington, Delaware).
49 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
&o Minutes 7/14/64, supra note 48, at 2.
51Id. 1. While it is likely that these suggestions were incorporated into the
letter, there is no way of being sure, since no copy could be located.
52 Letter from Professor Ernest L. Folk, III, July 17, 1968, at 1, on file at the
Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania [hereinafter cited as Folk Letter].
83 Morris Interview, supra note 22.
64 Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 2.
55 Id.
uo Folk Interview, supra note 26.
87 Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 1. All the replies mentioned are on file at
Professor Folk's office.
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to them for comment; sometimes firms would just write in suggestions.
Thus the Commission's files contain letters from, for example, Johnson
& Higgins, an insurance brokerage firm,58 Shell Oil Co., Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, and Reid & Priest.5 9
Other groups were also cultivated. Shortly after the Commission
was organized, Corroon met with the Corporation Committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to inform them that
a revision was underway. He also addressed them shortly before the
bill was introduced into the legislature and before the full Commission
had approved it.6" A copy of Folk's report and a draft of the law were
also sent to them.6 ' The Delaware Bar Association was not treated as
well. Its Corporation Law Committee normally handles revisions of
the corporation law, but if there was any resentment at being pre-
empted, it never surfaced. Corroon chairs the committee and he
called only one meeting-to get their approval of the draft bill before
they had read it. They got a little annoyed at this.62  There was also
some dissatisfaction with the fact that the new statute would contain
no explanation of the way in which the existing law would be changed,
or the reasons for these changes. Omission of such explanations would
put non-Commission lawyers at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, they
approved the draft with one lone dissent.6" Corroon also discussed the
provisions of the draft at a meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in Washington, D.C. Much to his surprise, the law professors
had no questions to ask.
6 4
The new statute was not written as rapidly as had been planned. 5
The ten-member Commission proved unwieldy, so Chief Justice
Southerland split up assignments among the members. A drafting
committee of three was formed-Corroon, Canby, and Arsht. Through
late 1966 and early 1967 they met to draft the actual statute,6 6 usually
meeting on Saturdays in Arsht's office.67 Their job was far from
mechanical. They considered many things the entire Commission
never did, and felt they had broad authority and full responsibility."8
58 See note 167 infra.
59 These letters are on file in the offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell;
Wilmington, Delaware.
6O Corroon Interview, *upra note 35.
61See Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 7th
meeting, December 15, 1964 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell;
Wilmington, Delaware).
62 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
63 The dissenter was Bruce Stargatt. Folk Interview, supra note 26.
,4 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
6 5 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
66 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
67 Interview with S. Samuel Arsht, Esq., in Wilmington, Delaware, July 24, 1968.
08 Corroon Interview, szpra note 35.
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Although they rejected some of Folk's recommendations,"0 and although
he never attended any of their meetings, much of his wording was
adopted in toto, a result which seems to frighten him.7"
Since the product being manufactured is a law, the legislature
(remember the legislature?) is supposed to have something to do with
it. But it is clear that this was not the case. Simply stated, the
Commission never expected the legislature to do anything with this
law except pass it.71 One member of the Commission referred to the
legislature as "just a bunch of farmers." Corroon did attend a caucus
of Democratic Senators, and Canby did attend a caucus of Republican
Senators. But Corroon was out in fifteen minutes, Canby in three, and
neither was asked any questions about the law.72 The legislature did
have one concern (besides tax revenues)-jobs. While it makes little
sense to have certificates of incorporation filed with the Secretary of
State and with county Recorders, 3 to eliminate the Recorders would
mean putting people out of jobs and the legislature might not have
accepted that. 4 So at the fourth meeting of the Commission, we find
that "[i]t was moved by Mr. Jackman and seconded by Judge
Herrmann that recordation as presently practiced should be con-
tinued . .. . .. There is no evidence that the legislature had any
other influence on the actual content of the law.
The bill was passed unanimously by the legislature and became
effective on July 3, 1967; amendments were worked through their
"normal" course, the Delaware Bar Association's Committee on Cor-
60 "I fully expected that many of the recommendations would not, for various
policy reasons, be adopted; but I wanted the Committee to have the benefit of as wide
a range of alternatives and ideas as I could supply." Letter from Ernest L. Folk, III,
to Richard F. Corroon, December 20, 1966, at 1 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols,
Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware). It is interesting to note some of the exotica
investigated by Professor Folk. For example, a "foreign resident corporation" statute
was drafted, which would have provided that "in time of war, invasion, international
conflict, revolution, [or] other emergency" a foreign corporation could "emigrate"
immediately to Delaware. See E. FOLK, REviEw OF THE DELAWARE CoRaoATIoN LAW
294-322 (1965-1967) [hereinafter cited as FOLK REPORT]. Bearer shares were also
considered. Folk wrote in his Report: "First[,] in principle, the chief domicile of
American corporations arguably should sanction a device which has proved useful in
other parts of the world. Indeed, this may attract some extra-United States enter-
prises to seek Delaware incorporation, and would facilitate use of the Delaware For-
eign Resident Corporation Act (if adopted)." Id. 288. Folk concluded, however,
that "a general authorization of bearer shares would be undesirable." Id. 290.
Bearer shares were unanimously rejected by the full Commission. Minutes of the
Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 15th meeting, April 20, 1965, at 1
(on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
70 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
71 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
72 Id.
73 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 103(b) (5) (Supp. 1968).
74 Jackman Interview, vupra note 32.
75 Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 4th meeting,
July 14, 1964, at 3 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington,
Delaware). Folk strongly suggested abolishing local recordation (see FOLK REPORT,
supra note 69, at 1-2) ; his awareness of the problem comes out in one sentence: "It is
recognized that local recordation may have to be continued for reasons not related to
the advantage and convenience of corporations." Id. 2.
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poration Law, and became effective on January 2, 1968. There were no
official documents explaining the statute's provisions, no legislative hear-
ings, and no publications by the Revision Commission. Folk's Report,
Review of the Delaware Corporation Law, may not prove extremely
helpful on key points and, in any event, it may be hard to find. The
Commission originally made only one copy publicly available (in the
New Castle County Law Library)," but xerographic reproductions can
now be bought from the Corporation Service Company for $25.00.
7 7
Despite the fact that the Commission had about $15,000 left over, Secre-
tary of State Dukes did not want to spend the money to reproduce the
report." Thus, the participants are left free to write their own "legisla-
tive history," an invaluable opportunity for a lawyer. This can be done
through writing books and articles "explaining" the law,79 or through
argument in litigation."0
It is difficult to believe that the process just described represents
the way legislation should be drafted. State legislatures may not be
noted for thoroughgoing consideration of proposed bills s' but the Dela-
ware legislature's lack of concern seems extraordinary. The legis-
lature simply abdicated its responsibility to consider the merits of its
corporation law. It made no attempt to go outside the Commission and
determine whether the statute served that "public interest" a legislature
is supposed to represent. It was content to leave its work entirely to an
appointed commission. It was content to leave this commission free
to do what it pleased; and it pleased to solicit the views only of cor-
porate interests and then to write a statute without one official word
to guide future interpretation.
But correction of these procedural defects would not necessarily
bring about changes in substance. Delaware measures its concern with
corporation law in terms of tax revenues, and in this sense the legis-
lature is representing the interests of Delawarians. This concern ought
to lead Delaware to turn to the corporate lawyer for guidance, par-
76 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
77 Letter from James M. Winfield, President, Corporation Service Company,
Wilmington, Delaware, March 10, 1969, on file at the Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania.
78 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
79 See, e.g., S. ARSHT & W. STAPLETON, AxALYsis OF THE NEW DELAwARE
CORPORATION LAW (1967) (published by the Prentice-Hall Corporation System, Inc.) ;
E. FOLK, THE RED BooK DIGEST OF THE NE w DELAWARE CoRoRAIoN LAW-1967
(1968) (published by the Corporation Service Co.) ; E. FOLK, THE NEv DELAWARE
CORmORATION LAW (1967) (published by the Corporation Service Co. and sold for
$2.00) ; Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive
Changes, 23 Bus. LAW. 75 (1967); Canby, Delaware's New Corporation Law, 39
PA. B. A. Q. 92 (1966). Mr. Stapleton is a partner in Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Tunnell, and was a member of the Commission's legal staff.
SO Although Professor Folk felt that the lawyers on the Commission would not
so use their position (Folk Interview, supra note 26), Morris said that one member
had already done so. Morris Interview, supra note 22.
81 See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law,
48 MINN. L. REv. 265, 275-77 (1963).
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ticularly those lawyers who represent the largest corporations. The
corporation lawyer can make an honest claim to know what will attract
corporations in the way of substantive law. Besides, who else could
work with "that fantastic statutory pattern which we have come to
know as corporation law, with its over-preoccupation with legal con-
ceptions which grow into monstrous shapes as they feed upon them-
selves"? I2 Even if Delaware went through the full procedure of legis-
lative hearings, who would one expect them to call? Perhaps counter-
vailing groups-such as law professors, plaintiffs' lawyers, or consum-
ers-would have appeared to oppose a liberal statute, although there is
no evidence that these groups attempted to influence the Commission.
If such groups were concerned, and had appeared, why should the
legislature have listened to them? As the New Jersey Corporation
Law Revision Commission noted in a preface to their 1968 revision,
"[a]ny attempt to provide such regulations in the public interest
through state incorporation acts and similar legislation would only
drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions." 13
Why should Delaware give up needed tax revenues in return for regu-
lation that can be so easily circumvented?
In light of these factors, it is difficult to lay blame exclusively on
the members of the Commission for writing a law designed to appeal
to corporate interests. True, the Commission never thought in terms
of public interest; or, more precisely, assumed that corporate interest
and public interest are the same. But they did not believe they had
done something unethical, or dishonest, or deceptive. They would not
have opened their files so readily, or talked so frankly, had they felt
they had something to hide. They all operated properly, well within
the rules of the game. This, after all, is the way Delaware has written
its corporation law since 1899, and the members of the Commission
were not chosen to correct the drift, had they perceived correction to be
necessary. Nobody on the Commission, and nobody with whom the
Commission talked, was about to suggest that perhaps the game was
no good. As Professor Latty wrote, "[y]ou do not find beatniks on
corporation law committees." 84
Nor does the blame for selling corporation law lie exclusively with
Delaware. Perhaps other State legislatures do not have their cor-
poration laws written for them to the extent that Delaware does, but
this matters only indirectly. So long as there are national corpora-
tions, for whom state domicile is only a legal concept, there is bound
to be at least one state which will seek out their business. Delaware
has been one of the states that traditionally have done so. Its law will
8 2 Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL
L. Q. 599, 619 (1965).
83 NJ. REv. STAT. § 14A, at XI (1969). See IIrVsTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION
OF ECONOMIC PowER; FINAL REPORT AND RECOmmENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY
NATIONAL Ecoxo Ic CommITTEE, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1941).
84 Latty, mepra note 82, at 616.
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either be copied-forcing Delaware to go further--or Delaware will
get most of the business. In either event Delaware will be writing a
national corporation law.
III. THE STATUTE
It now becomes necessary to examine the product, which, not
surprisingly, makes only the weakest attempt at restricting the cor-
poration.8 5  Section-by-section analysis will not be attempted; rather,
the discussion will concentrate on several important provisions.
It is the managers of the corporation who will usually be buying
the law, so an obvious way to attract business is to limit the share-
holders' rights. How far this idea can go may be seen in section
211(b), which, as originally passed in 1967, had provided that at the
annual shareholder meeting to elect directors, "any other proper busi-
ness notice of which was given in the notice of the meeting, may be
transacted." 86 Since notice of the meeting is sent out by manage-
ment, 7 this would have meant that shareholders could not discuss at
the meeting any questions management did not wish to discuss.8 This
was just too much of a perversion, even for Delaware; 89 the statute
was amended to allow transaction of "any other proper business." 90
But a provision allowing shareholders to put questions for discussion
in management's notice of the meeting was never considered-it would
have been improper in a management-oriented statute.91 Shareholders
are also not allowed to propose amendments to the corporation's
charter; amendments must originate by a resolution of the board of
directors. 2  So, to change the charter, shareholders must first change
(or persuade) the management.
In the merger area, shareholders are denied appraisal rights if the
corporation is registered on a national securities exchange or if its
85 Another example of the lack of restriction on corporate activity in Delaware
is the lack of any Blue Sky Law. This is a good selling point; the Corporation
Service Co. places it third on its list of twenty-five "advantages of the Delaware
law." The list is printed in, e.g., E. FOLK, THE RED BOOK DIGEST OF THE NEW
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAw-1967 iv (1968). According to Morris, stock fraud
in Delaware is investigated by Col. Lamb of the State Police. Morris Interview,
supra note 22.
86 Law of July 3, 1967, v. 56, ch. 50 [1967] Del. Laws 185 (repealed 1968).
87 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §222 (Supp. 1968).
88 This provision, of course, would not have limited the shareholders' Federal
right to have management include in the proxy statement a shareholder proposal which
would be voted on. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
89 Interview with Henry Canby, Esq., in Wilmington, Delaware, July 25, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Canby Interview].
' 0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (Supp. 1968).
91 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
92 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(d) (1) (Supp. 1968).
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stock is held by more than 1999 shareholders.93  This should effec-
tively eliminate appraisal rights in a fair number of corporations. The
shareholder who has appraisal rights and wishes to preserve them, must
file his objection to the merger before the vote is taken, and may not
vote in favor of the merger; 11 but the notice the corporation must send
informing shareholders of a merger vote need not tell the shareholders
how to preserve their appraisal rights, or even that they have any such
rights. 5  And if the shares to be issued or delivered under the plan
of merger do not exceed fifteen per cent of the shares of the same class
of the surviving corporation, shareholders of the surviving corporation
do not even have the right to vote on the merger.'" Professor Folk
wrote in his Report that the fifteen per cent procedure "could be abused
by successive mergers with various corporations, no one of which
involved an issue of more than 15% of the previously outstanding
shares." Nevertheless, he concluded that "this Report sees no funda-
mental objections to the proposed procedure; and if it would reasonably
serve business interests, it should be adopted." 17 No doubt, easier
merger provisions will serve business interests in today's merger-
conscious economy.98
Financial plums are also offered to managers. Section 122(15)
empowers the corporation to "establish and carry out pension, profit
sharing, stock option, stock purchase, stock bonus, retirement, benefit,
incentive and compensation plans, trusts and provisions for any or all
of its directors, officers, and employees . . . . " The previous
93 See id. § 262(k). Professor Folk writes that "West Virginia is the only state
which has no appraisal rights, apparently the relic of an abortive effort long ago to
attract corporations." FoLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 196 n.l The implication is
clear that denial of this right to shareholders will be attractive to corporations. This
was not quite done in Delaware, evidently because of the fear that courts might more
easily disapprove "unfair" mergers if the shareholders had no alternative remedy.
Corroon stated that § 262(k) has been criticized by lawyers for this reason; he does
not agree that the section will have such an effect. Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
0 See Dmr. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (Supp. 1968).
95 See id. §251(c).
9 See id. §251 (f) (2). The 15% provision was suggested to Canby by Dewey,
Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood. FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 195A. Pro-
fessor Folk, in THE NEW DELAwARE CoroATiox LAW 32 (1967), wrote that this
type of merger is "not such a major change as to require a shareholder vote or
appraisal rights"; in his Report, however, he did suggest that a 10% figure would be
"more conservative." See FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 195B.
07 FOLK REP RT, supra note 69, at 195A, 195B (emphasis added).
08For example, Royal Industries, in explaining to its shareholders the reasons
for moving to Delaware, wrote: "In particular, recent revisions of the Delaware
corporation law will add flexibility to the Company's acquisition program by permit-
ting companies which are substantially smaller than the Company . . . to be acquired
by merger without the approval of the Company's stockholders. . . . Dissenting
stockholders of the Company are presently entitled under California law to receive
payment for their shares in connection with a merger or consolidation. Stockholders
of Royal Delaware [the "new" corporation] will not have any such right so long
as its shares are listed on the American Stock Exchange or any other national secu-
rities exchange." Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders, March 29, 1968, at 7
(on file at the Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(15) (Supp. 1968).
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statute had not expressly conferred this power, but the new statute
makes no attempt to set any procedures for management to follow so
as to prevent possible abuses. There is not even a provision to require
disclosure of the amounts paid. One would think that the share-
holders might want to know whether, for example, they are paying
directly for the college education of an officer's child. For, according
to Professor Folk, "[t]his language is sufficiently broad to permit
financial aid to dependents of corporate personnel as an aspect of com-
pensation, pension and incentive arrangement for employees." 100 Then
there is section 143, which permits the corporation to make loans to
officers or employees, as long as the board of directors judges that
the loan may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.-', The
board may give the loan without interest and without security-and
again there is no provision for disclosure to shareholders.
10 2
Professor Folk wrote in 1966: "The aid-to-directors movement
has now so exhausted itself in an orgy of indulgence and favoritism that
little more remains to be done on the state level." "' But Professor
Folk was wrong. Much remained to be done, and in 1967 Delaware
did it with the passage of section 145-indemnification.
1 4
There had been considerable criticism of the old indemnification
provision, section 122(10).'0 Arsht writes: "Neither the courts nor
corporate counsel found the language of this statutory provision wholly
satisfactory . . . and numerous charter and by-law provisions were
adopted in an attempt to clarify and extend the statutory power of
indemnification." 106 The second sentence of the old section was so
broad that "uncertainty existed in many instances as to whether such
provisions transgressed the limits which the courts had indicated they
300E. FOLK, THE NE-w DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 9 (1967). According to
Folk, such aid was already being granted under the old statute. Folk Interview,
supra note 26.
101 DEL. Co E ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (Supp. 1968).
'
0 2 Id. Professor Folk felt that § 143 was overly liberal. Folk Interview, supra
note 26.
'03 Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 889.
'
0 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968). On the subject of indemnification,
see generally G. WASHINGTON & J. BisHoP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECU-
TIVE (1963).
105 Law of April 15, 1943, v. 44, ch. 125 [1943] Del. Laws 422 (repealed 1967).
Section 122(10) provided:
Every corporation ... shall have power to ... [i]ndemnify any and all
of its directors or officers . . . against expenses actually and necessarily
incurred by them in connection with the defense of any action, suit or
proceeding in which they . . . are made parties ... by reason of being or
having been directors or officers ... of the corporation ... except in relation
to matters as to which [they] . . . shall be adjudged .. .liable for negligence
or misconduct in the performance of duty. Such indemnification shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be
entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise.
106 S. ARSHT & W. STAPLTON, ANALYSIS OF THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION
LAW 327 (1967) (emphasis added).
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would establish based on public policy." 107 But the new provision was
not written simply out of a desire to clear up ambiguous language;
at root, the motivation was the increasing fear of financial liability. An
address to the Association of General Counsel in 1966-a copy of
which is in the Commission's files-relates:
I have noticed in the last year or so that it [indemnifica-
tion] has become a very "hot" item. Taking my own office
as an example, I have been personally involved or consulted
by my partners on this subject as applied to at least a dozen
different corporations in the last year-and I might add it is
still going on. I suppose the highly publicized situations, with
potentially astronomical exposure for the individuals in-
volved-I have in mind the Philadelphia electric antitrust
cases, American Express and the Salad Oil machinations,
Bill Sol Estes and his grain elevators and others-have had a
good deal to do with the current interest.108
Certainly most officers and directors would think indemnification im-
proper in the examples given, but these examples do indicate the presence
of corporate fear and the direction of corporate desires for indemnifica-
tion.
The argument favoring indemnification was stated simply in 1966
by Orvel Sebring, then Chairman-Elect of the ABA Section on Cor-
poration, Banking and Business Laws, and a member of the Section's
Committee on Corporation Laws: "[Indemnification] is good social
policy . . . because we must get the best men available to run our
corporations. The lifeblood of business depends upon the quality of
guidance which officers and directors can give the corporations. So
there is a strong case for indemnification." 100 The American Bar
Association has made such arguments before in connection with in-
demnification. When the Securities and Exchange Commission held
hearings on Note (a) to Rule 460-which provides that indemnification
for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 either be waived
or submitted to a court for approval "1--John Mulford, Esq., testified
as to the ABA's opposition. In response to arguments similar to
Sebring's, Chairman Armstrong stated: "I have just great difficulty in
believing that the American Corporations would be unable to continue
107 Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive
Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 78 (1967). See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey
Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 357, 182 A.2d 647, 655-56 (1962) (Seitz, C., suggests legislature
clarify § 122 (10)).
los Address by Royal Victor to Association of General Counsel, Clayton, Mo.,
October 20, 1966, at 2 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell;
Wilmington, Delaware).
109 Sebring, Symposin: Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 22 Bus.
LAw. 29, 124 (1966).
110 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.460, note a (1957); id. § 230.460(a) (1954).
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the services of acceptable directors." I-" That was 1957, and there is as
yet no evidence that qualified persons have been deterred by the require-
ment. But the rhetoric lingers on and we find even General Motors
claiming that broad indemnification "is considered appropriate . . .
from the standpoint of enabling the Corporation to continue to attract
and retain those best qualified for service as directors and officers." 112
Officers and directors may feel they are being treated more equitably
if they can be indemnified for liabilities arising from corporate duties,
and this may be good social policy in certain situations. But it is
difficult to believe that someone will be deterred from becoming an
officer of a corporation like General Motors simply because he may
some day be sued.
The pressure for broad indemnification could not be resisted.
Large corporations were busy revising their indemnification by-laws-
Bethlehem Steel in 1964, Firestone, Goodyear, Monsanto and Standard
Oil of New Jersey in 1965, International Harvester, Southern Pacific
and Texaco in 1966." A liberal indemnification provision would be
a good selling point and without something more explicit than section
122(10), counsel could not be sure that an award of indemnification
would obtain judicial approval if it ever came to litigation. What the
consumers received, and how they got it, is worth analysis." 4
Subdivision (a) of section 145 empowers the corporation to in-
demnify directors, officers, employees or agents of the corporation for
actual and reasonably incurred expenses (such as attorney's fees),
judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement. It applies to adminis-
trative or investigative proceedings "' and all criminal or civil suits,
other than derivative actions, which grow out of a person's official
capacity. To be indemnified, the party must have acted "in good
faith" and "in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
'111 Hearings on Proposed Note to Rule 460 before the Securities & Exchange
Commission, January 17, 1957, at 28 (on file at the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion, Washington, D.C.).
1 12 General Motors Notice & Proxy Statement for May 19, 1967, Shareholder
Meeting, at 24 (on file at the Securities & Exchange Commisssion, Washington, D.C.).
113 Address by Royal Victor, mupra note 108, at 7-8.
14 Not everyone condemned retention of § 122(10). For example, a June 22,
1966 letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore to the Commission stated that they felt
§ 122(10) was line, that they did not know of any "serious problems" or "abuses"
under it, and that the new § 145 would cut dovn its coverage (at 2) (on file in offices
of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, Delaware).
115 Arsht writes that one of the reasons for revising section 122(10) was the
"unjustifiable narrowness of classes of persons to whom money could be paid and
types of proceedings." Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 107, at 78. Thus subdivision
(a) tries to include everyone, except shareholders, and every type of proceeding,
including investigations that have nothing to do with adjudication. Oddly enough,
appeals are not specifically covered, but there is little doubt that judicial construction
could find that the legislature "intended" to include them. Professor Folk felt they
were meant to be included. Folk Interview, supra note 26. But the competing New
Jersey indemnification provision takes no chances; appeals are specifically covered.
See N.J. REV. STAT. tit. 14A, § 14A:3-5(1) (e) (Supp. 1968).
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to the best interests of the corporation"; "" in a criminal case, the de-
fendant must also have had "no reasonable cause to believe his conduct
was unlawful." But the termination of any action "by judgment, order,
settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its
equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption" that the person
did not act in accordance with the requisite standards.
The first important thing to note about subdivision (a) is that
it is an example of enablingism-the State enables management to fill
out the corporation law in the way it feels best."1 Enabling provisions
recognize that a general corporation law, if drawn too specifically, may
not be well suited for all corporations."" Thus the State avoids making
policy decisions that may force an expansion or limitation of corporate
powers in ways not agreeable to all corporations. Here, the cor-
poration is given discretion in deciding whether to award indemnifica-
tion; management can still give itself a right to indemnification, by
properly wording its charter or indemnification by-law.-'9 Mr. Jack-
man's United States Corporation Company, in a handy pamphlet titled
Delaware Corporation Forms, suggests the following for prospective
clients' certificates of incorporation: "The Corporation shall, to the
full extent permitted by Section 145 of the Delaware Corporation Law,
as amended from time to time, indemnify all persons whom it may in-
demnify pursuant thereto." "o General Motors, in Article 31 of their
by-laws, is likewise quite specific in giving a right of indemnification to
parties who have fulfilled the standards set out in subdivision (a).21
316DEL. CODs ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (a) (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
117 For some other examples of enablingism, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102
(b) (3) (pre-emptive rights granted only to the extent given in certificate of incorpo-
ration), § 109 (a) (shareholders have power to make, alter or repeal by-laws, but
certificate of incorporation may confer power on directors), § 212(a) (unless provided
in certificate of incorporation, each shareholder entitled to one vote for each share),
§ 214 (certificate of incorporation may provide for cumulative voting), § 216 (certifi-
cate of incorporation or by-laws may specify votes necessary for a quorum or to
transact business), § 242(a) (4) (accrued, but unpaid, dividends on preferred stock
may be cancelled by amending certificate of incorporation).
118 Delaware recognizes this to some extent in its special provisions for close
corporations. See DEL. CODE AN . tit. 8, §§ 341-355 (Supp. 1968).
11) It would probably be safer to put it in the charter; by-laws can be amended
by the shareholders, but the charter cannot. See DEt.. CODE ANN. § 109(a) (Supp.
1968) ; note 92 supra and accompanying text.
120 U. S. CORPORATION Co., DELAwARE CoRPORATION FORMS 9 (1967) (emphasis
added).
121 See General Motors Notice & Proxy Statement for May 19, 1967 Shareholder
Meeting, at 40 (on file at the Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C.). The history of General Motors' new by-law is interesting. The by-law was
adopted by the Board of Directors on November 7, 1966, effective immediately but
subject to shareholder approval. See Form 8-K, filed pursuant to § 13, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Report for November 1966 (on file at the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.). Wording of the by-law bore a striking
resemblance to § 145--which was not passed by Delaware until July 3, 1967, a full 8
months later. In its notice for the May, 1967, meeting, General Motors informed its
shareholders that, in the opinion of its Delaware counsel, the by-law was legal.
Notice & Proxy Statement, mipra, at 24. This may have been true, since no one
really knew what § 122(10) meant. General Motors' Delaware counsel's assurance
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The second important point is that a director may be indemnified
if he reasonably believed his actions were "not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation." Neither the original draft of section 145
submitted by Folk,12  nor a draft prepared by Corroon,' had this
provision. According to Corroon, the sentence was added to reach
good faith takings of corporate opportunities; ". if an officer or director
takes a corporate opportunity in good faith, he would certainly think
his actions were not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.
It is arguable, however, that insider trading would also be "not opposed
to" the corporation's best interests.'-  The latter construction had
not occurred to Corroon "6-- despite the fact that he had been given
the responsibility for drafting the indemnification provision'T Others
had no such doubts. Arsht writes: "The phrase 'or not opposed to'
was included to cover the case where a director is engaged in a purely
personal transaction, such as a purchase or sale for his own account
of stock of the corporation . . .," ' Orvel Sebring, when discussing
the Model Business Corporation Act's new indemnification provision,
may be explained by the fact that they knew what § 145 would provide-their counsel
is Richards, Layton & Finger, one of whose partners is Henry Canby.
We might note that General Motors did not have to submit this by-law to its
shareholders, since G.M.'s by-laws allow unilateral amendment by the Board. See
General Motors By-laws, June 5, 1967, Article 69 (on file at the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.). But getting shareholder approval seems
to be in conformity with advice given in an address to the Association of General
Counsel: "Stockholder approval precludes successful challenge to the provision on
the ground that it was adopted by a board of directors in conflict with the best interests
of the corporation." Address by Royal Victor, supra note 108, at 18. G.M.'s faith
in its shareholders was not misplaced-223,933,951 votes were received in favor of
ratification, or 99.0%; 2,311,466 votes opposed, or 1.0%. See Nader, General Motors
Corp.: Distribution of Ownership and Ability of Management to Gain Overwhelming
Proxy Support for Position it Urges, in Hearings Before the Sen. Subcomins. of the
Select Comm. on Smlall Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings]. The figures on other General Motors proxy votes further confirm
the easy time that the management of a large corporation has with its shareholders.
From 1962 through 1967, the smallest percentage received for management proposals
w as 98.4% of the vote cast (proposals relating to employee pension and stock option
plans) ; the largest percentage received for a shareholder proposal was 5.3% of the
vote cast (proposal to limit executive compensation to $200,000 per year). Id.
122See FOLK RFPORT, supra note 69, at 94.
123 See Memorandum from Richard F. Corroon to the Commission, November 13,
1964 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware)
[hereinafter cited as Corroon Memorandum]. Chief Justice Southerland had assigned
Corroon the task of drafting an indemnification provision. Minutes of the Delaware
Corporation Law Revision Commission, 5th Meeting, August 13, 1964, at 2 (on file
in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell).
124 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
125 See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
223-24 (1933); H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). .But
see Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REy. 470 (1969); Schotland, Unsafe
At Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1425, 1452 (1967) ; cf. Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d
5 (1949) ; Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
126 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
127See note 123 supra.
128 S. ARSHT & W. STAPLETON, supra note 106, at 327.
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which is an exact duplicate of Delaware's, 9 writes: "The words 'or not
opposed to, the best interests of the corporation' were inserted to cover
the possibility of a case . . . based on acts in an individual capacity
such as were involved in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case." "' Professor
Folk agrees with this interpretation and he opposed including the
phrase. 3' It is bad enough to indemnify a director or officer who,
even in good faith, took a corporate opportunity-to do so is to allow
him to keep profits that belong to the corporation. But to allow him
to retain profits from insider trading sounds like a direct evasion of
federal law.
The next important point is the combination of the phrase "no
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful" 12' with the "non-
presumption" clause. Losing a suit-or even being convicted and
fined in a criminal prosecution--does not necessarily mean that indem-
nification will not be made for the amount paid in judgment or fine.
Professor Folk explains the policy underlying such a provision: "The
theory is that an act may be contrary to the interests of the state, but
it is not for that reason alone a breach of duty to the corporation or
even against the best interests of the corporation." "' Of course, the
convicted criminal must have had no reasonable cause to believe his
conduct was unlawful; as an example, Professor Folk writes that a
convicted price-fixer could make no such claim, since everyone knows
that price-fixing is clearly illegal. 3 ' But what of the convicted price-
fixer who contends, not that price-fixing is legal, but that he never
performed the acts in question? Perhaps on a plea of guilty no one
could make such an argument with a straight face; but on a plea of
nolo contendere, and particularly on a guilty verdict after a jury trial,
the argument could be made. This possibility was evidently never seen
by the draftsmen of section 145; Professor Folk had to admit that
indemnification could indeed be granted in such circumstances.' 3 In
other words, Delaware law may purport to make it possible to have
329 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACT § 4A (Supp. 1967).
130 Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Di-
rectors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAw. 95, 102 (1967). As of June 1963, the
SEC had not expressed any position on indemnification in insider trading situations.
One staff member stated, however, that in his view where the relief granted was to
return the insider's profits to the corporation, the re-return of the money to the
insider would be rather anomalous. Interview with Donald Feuerstein, Esq., General
Counsel's Office, Securities & Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C., June
12, 1968.
131 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
132 A December 15, 1966 letter (page 2) from W. F. Kenney, Vice President
and General Counsel of Shell Oil Co., to Henry Canby suggested putting in this
clause (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware)
[hereinafter cited as Kenney Letter]. Folk's draft did not include the phrase. See
FOLK REPoRT, supra note 69, at 94-96.
133E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CoRPoRATIo, LAW 12-13 (1967) (emphasis
added).
.34Id. 12.
.3 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
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fines paid by the corporation, rather than by the officer or director
convicted of violating a criminal statute.
Subdivision (b) deals with derivative actions. It empowers the
corporation to indemnify the same group of people, under the same
mental standards, as in subdivision (a). There are two differences:
(1) the party can only get expenses incurred in a defense or settlement;
and (2) if he has been "adjudged to be liable for negligence or mis-
conduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation," he can only
get indemnification for "such expenses" as the court may deem
proper.
18 6
There was some controversy over what subdivision (b) should
cover. After all, what would bring more joy to an officer or director
than to eliminate the worry of liability in stockholder suits? But it
was evidently too unpalatable to treat an officer or director who lost a
derivative suit in court in the same fashion as one who lost any other
type of suit in court. Professor Folk wrote in his Report: "Since the
[derivative] action produced a corporate recovery for breach of duty,
a repayment to the faithless person of all his expenses plus the judgment
against him would defeat the purpose of the original action and its
subversion of fiduciary duty enforcement would probably be against
public policy." 137
So a more subtle way of insulating management from responsi-
bility was sought-full indemnification of out-of-court settlements.
While the settlement itself is judicially supervised,' the granting of
indemnification would not be. It was the American Bar Association
people responsible for drafting the Model Business Corporation Act who
wanted this provision. They had been working on a redraft of their
indemnification provision for about two years and had sent a copy to
the Delaware Commission. To Willard Scott, Chairman of the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws, which is responsible for the Model
Act, full indemnification of settlements is a wonderful idea. After all,
by indemnifying the officer or director when he settled, settlements
would obviously be encouraged; this would save the corporation money,
since high legal fees would not be run up by going to trial.8 9 One must
13 6 The only construction problem is the meaning of "such expenses." May the
amount the defendant has paid to the corporation by way of judgment be returned to
him by the court? Or does "such expenses" mean only such things as lawyer's fees?
Arsht writes that the provision "is intended primarily to deal with the case where
no bad faith was involved and the type of conduct for which liability was imposed
had not been previously determined to be wrongful." S. ARSHT & W. STAPLETON,
.upra note 106, at 328. This would seem to indicate that "such expenses" can mean
everything the defendant had to pay out. Professor Folk, however, feels that indemni-
fication of judgments is probably not covered. Folk Interview, supra note 26; cf.
E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 13 (1967). His construction takes
some strength from the fact that in subdivision (a), "expenses" is differentiated from
"judgments" and "amounts paid in settlement."
137 FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 86.
138 See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(c).
139 Scott Interview, supra note 23.
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wonder, however, how many derivative suits would ever get to trial
if a guilty officer or director could avoid paying anything by simply
settling out of court. But then, as Professor Folk, and others, have
noted, the "Model" Act is "not known for its restrictive attitude to-
wards management." 140
Even Delaware could not accept Scott's position. Professor Folk
wrote in his Report: "Uncontrolled indemnification of settlement
derivative suits . . . . [b]y promoting settlement of claims which can-
not be successfully defended . . . undercuts enforcement of fiduciary
duties." 141 Not that the Model Act people did not try to convince
the Commission. Two Philadelphia lawyers, Orvel Sebring and Car-
roll Wetzell, were sent down to Wilmington to discuss it with the
drafting committee of Canby, Corroon and Arsht. 42 When that failed,
they withdrew their proposal "in the interests of harmony" and adopted
Delaware's new statute, almost word for word.14 3  Sebring states what
now seems to be the "official" position of the Model Act: "Although it
may be argued that to permit indemnification of settlement payments
under a strict standard of conduct might lessen the cost of litigation to
be borne by the corporation, the result would be confusing and would
nullify the derivative action to a large degree." 14
Folk's proposed statute would have gone in the opposite direc-
tion-indemnification of expenses in settled derivative suits would have
to be approved by Chancery.' 45 But Corroon opposed this, feeling it
would be stricter than section 122(10),14 and Delaware was certainly
not about to get any stricter. Thus the present statute emerged-for
out-of-court settlement, return of expenses; for adjudicated liabilities,
return only of such expenses as the court shall approve.
147
Subdivision (c) is relatively straightforward. It gives the de-
fendant who has been successful "on the merits or otherwise" in any
suit or proceeding mentioned in (a) and (b) a right to be indemnified.
W. F. Kenney, Vice President and General Counsel of Shell Oil
Company, expressed his dissatisfaction with this in a letter to Henry
Canby: "I think 'or otherwise' should be stricken. A corporation
should not be required to indemnify a crook merely because he was
140 Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise
Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C. L. REv. 768, 841 (1965). See, e.g.,
Latty, supra note 82, at 615; cf. ICatz, The Philosophy of Midcentnry Corporation
Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTmP. PROB. 177, 188 (1958).
1
41 Fo- REPORT, supra note 69, at 89.
142 Scott Interview, supra note 24.
14 Id. In fact, they accepted it so completely that an early draft of the Model
Act even referred to the "Court of Chancery" in subdivision (b). Folk Interview,
supra note 26.
144 Sebring, supra note 130, at 103. It must be noted, however, that, as of July
1968, Scott seemed unconvinced. Scott Interview, supra note 23.
145 See FoLx REPoRT, sipra note 69, at 95-96.
146 See Corroon Memorandum, supra note 123.
147 Professor Folk feels that this provision will still have the effect of encouraging
settlements. Folk Interview, supra note 26.
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successful on some technical defense." 148 But the phrase was not
removed.
Subdivision (d) is either very subtle or badly drafted. Sub-
divisions (a) and (b) provide that a party must meet certain mental
standards if he is to be indemnified; subdivision (d) provides the
method for deciding whether the party has met these standards. The
decision may be made by a majority vote of a quorum of directors
not parties to the suit; if such a quorum cannot be obtained, or if the
quorum so directs, the decision may be made by independent legal
counsel, or the decision may be made by the shareholders.
It is likely that the decision-makers will be favorable to the party
seeking indemnification. For one, courts are not mentioned. 49  For
another, it is difficult to see how management can ever be truly "dis-
interested"; the directors who vote today may be voted on tomorrow.
The board may, however, prefer to have "independent counsel" make
the decision, to give the appearance of removing any conflict of
interest.150 In fact, this is precisely what General Motors did in its
recent by-law.'' But there is no standard for independence in the
statute. Professor Folk stated that house counsel or ordinary outside
counsel would probably not be considered "independent"; a reputable
law firm, such as Covington & Burling of Washington, D.C., if it was
not normally used as outside counsel, would probably be considered
independent. As to what would happen if such a law firm began to do
a large volume of this work, Professor Folk had no answer.'8 2
The question of independence points up the difficulty of judicial
review of these awards. The court is given no mandate to see whether
"independent" legal counsel has made the correct decision, for that
would make the use of such counsel meaningless; rather, the court can
only determine whether counsel was, in fact, independent. Can a
court know whether counsel was picked because management felt it
would be favorable (possibly because such counsel had decided favor-
ably in other cases), or because management truly desired impartial
counsel? 153 No.
148 Kenney Letter, supra note 132, at 1.
149 Judge Seitz wanted Chancery also to be able to authorize indemnification;
Corroon opposed this. Corroon Memorandum, supra note 123.
150 Cf. note 121 supra.
151 See General Motors Notice & Proxy Statement, supra note 121, at 40. It
must be noted that G.M.'s by-law gives the award as of right when independent counsel
finds the requisite standards have been fulfilled; the Board of Directors still retains
the discretion to award indemnification if counsel does not so find. Id.
152 Folk Interview, supra note 26. Professor Joseph W. Bishop notes that
Westinghouse, in its by-law, has provided for "regular counsel of the corporation."
Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1080 n.7 (1968).
163 "[T]he problem .. . is that those who choose them [independent counsel] are
pretty sure to favor a lawyer who has acquired in the course of a corporate practice
a sympathetic understanding of the problems of corporate management. It is not
easy for even a lawyer of the most rugged integrity to be harsh to people who were
responsible for his retainer." Bishop, supra note 152, at 1080.
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But the board of directors' decision will not be any easier to
review. In court its decision will be protected by the sound business
judgment rule; the convicted price-fixer is free to convince the
board that he did not do what he had been found guilty of '5' and
the court will only be able to inquire whether the board was "dis-
interested," a difficult task at best. Then there is always shareholder
approval. One must question how shareholders are to evaluate
whether the officer or director acted in "good faith" or whether he
reasonably believed his actions were "in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation," or whether he had "no reasonable cause
to believe his conduct was unlawful." Presumably management will
write a narrative of the events and recommend conclusions for the
shareholders to draw. The ease of getting shareholder approval, par-
ticularly in a large corporation, is hard to overestimate.0 5
Subdivision (e) may be treated briefly. It is a "pay-as-you-go"
provision, empowering the board to advance expenses to the defendant
upon receipt of an "undertaking" that he will repay them unless he is
later found to be entitled to indemnification." 6 "Undertaking" is not
defined in the statute, but Professor Folk states that it need be nothing
more than a promise to repay.'
It has been pointed out that the original impetus for rewriting old
section 122(10) was its vagueness. Under particular fire was the
lack of guidance given by the second sentence, which provided that
section 122 (10) did not exclude indemnification by any other meansY"
Professor Folk wrote: "While indemnifying executives for many risks
of office is, in the judgment of this Report, to be favored, this objective
is not satisfactorily achieved by wording the indemnification statute so
broadly that its language authorizes indemnification in obviously in-
equitable situations. Such, indeed, is a possible construction of present
Section 122(10) . . . ." ' Later in his Report, Professor Folk again
stressed his position: "This Report's view is that the 'non-exclusive'
provision in Section 122(10) (second sentence) should be eliminated
. . . . [P]reserving the non-exclusive clause invites misuse of cor-
porate powers for improper indemnification .... ," 160
In light of this it is astounding to see that subdivision (f) is a non-
exclusivity provision with a vengeance. It provides that section 145 is
154See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
15 See note 121 supra. It is also not stated whether the party seeking indemni-
fication may vote his shares in favor of his own indemnification.
:56 Corroon's proposed draft had no such provision (see Corroon Memorandum,
mspra note 123) ; nor did Folk's (see FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 94-96).
1,7 Folk Interview, supra note 26. This interpretation makes sense in light of
§ 143, which provides that loans may be made to officers and employees without secu-
rity or interest. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
158 See note 105 and text accompanying notes 106-07 mspra.
159 FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 76.
160 Id. 92-93.
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not exclusive of any other right that may be provided under any by-law,
agreement (presumably, this includes contracts), vote of stockholders
or disinterested directors, or otherwise. It then adds that this may
apply not only to what the officer or director does in his official capacity,
but also to "action in another capacity while holding such office." This
would allow the corporation, for example, to cover the cost of an officer
or director's automobile accident 161 or to support his illegitimate chil-
dren.'62 Thus, subdivision (f) contains the potential to free officers
and directors from any financial liability whatsoever for any
wrongdoing.
Why was it retained? Corroon's original draft did not include
it,'" but after the draft was circulated among various lawyers, objec-
tions came back to the committee. These lawyers wanted it retained.6
So it was put back for "whatever it was worth"; Corroon feels it is not
worth much. 65 Canby's view on its retention is even more illuminat-
ing, both with respect to section 145 and the entire statute. He stated
that subdivision (f) was included because the corporation law generally
is not meant to limit anyone's imagination. If some lawyer could think
of another situation for indemnification-which a court would approve,
of course-then why should the draftsmen's limited imagination stop
him ?166
Finally, subdivision (g) empowers the corporation to purchase
and maintain indemnification insurance on behalf of any persons named
in subdivisions (a) and (b). This insurance may cover any liability
"whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify
him against such liability under the provisions of this section." In
other words, the corporation can do more for management by paying
premiums than it can do as a self-insurer. For, if it can get the
insurance,"' the corporation may now insulate its management from
161 Corroon agreed with this example. Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
162 Professor Folk, who agreed with this example, was not happy with the
inclusion of subdivision (f). Folk Interview, supra note 26.
163 See Corroon Memorandum, mspra note 123.
16 Corroon Interview, supra note 35. Whatever letters were received to this
effect could not be located; nor could Corroon remember who had objected.
105 Id.
166 Canby Interview, upra note 19.
167 On the subject of indemnification insurance, see, e.g., Bishop, supra note 152,
at 1086-1103; Wallace, Facts and Fallacies of Directors' and Officers' Liability,
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1967, at 1; Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability
Inmrance, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 716 (1967); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate
Executives, 80 HARv. L. REv. 648 (1967). The availability and coverage of present
policies is a complex subject that will not here be treated in depth, but a few facts
may be helpful. Indemnification insurance is not new, having been conceived by
Lloyd's after World War II. Within the past six years, however, it has gained
prominence; there are now eight American firms writing indemnification insurance:
American Home (possibly the leading domestic writer), Liberty Mutual, Kemper,
Wassau, Employer Group of Boston, American States Insurance Group (Indian-
apolis), St. Paul, and Pacific Indemnity. Interview with P, Brian Jarman, Assistant
Vice President, American Home Assurance Co., in New York City, July 19, 1968.
American Home, for one, is treating the insurance very conservatively and it is
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all potential liabilities-including judgments in derivative actions.
There are no statutory limits or guidelines on this insurance since
Delaware's philosophy is (surprise!) not to regulate.16 Professor
Folk writes: "In authorizing corporations to take out indemnity insur-
ance, the new law seeks to leave the field untrammeled by restrictions
which may turn out to be inappropriate as this new form of liability
insurance develops." 169
No explicit provision in either Folk's Report 170 or in Corroon's
draft 17' authorized insurance; Folk, after receiving a copy of the draft
statute, suggested expressly validating the use of insurance, noting that
the Model Act people were considering adding such a provision.
11 2
Some of the reasons why the drafting committee put it in, and why
corporations want it, are well stated in a letter, in the Commission's
files, from Ellen Diehlmann, counsel for Johnson & Higgins, a Wall
Street insurance broker writing indemnification insurance: "[The insur-
evidently not easy to get. St. Paul reports that the number of policies they have
issued does not exceed 250. Letter from R. S. Almquist, General Liability Under-
writer, The St. Paul Insurance Companies, June 14, 1968, on file at the Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Jarman stated that American Home treats
it as a defense-cost contract, rather than as a claims contract, and that they have not,
to his knowledge, paid out any claims under their policies. Jarman Interview, supra.
Mr. Almquist writes that they have had "nine reported incidents involving the cover
and the amount to be ultimately paid will be dependent upon the course of present
negotiations and development of the case." Letter, supra. As to premium rates: "It
is impossible to give you the rates for this coverage as this is dependent upon a
number of factors some of which are the number of directors and officers, the size
of the business and the type of business." Id. In any event, the SEC does not yet
think that indemnification insurance is a problem because the rates are felt to be quite
high. Interview with George McHaley, Esq., Division of Corporate Finance, Securities
& Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C., June 6, 1968.
The reasons for the upsurge in popularity, according to Mr. Jarman, are notoriety
of shareholder suits, the fact that people are very "claims" conscious and the fact
that insurance companies are trying to make the insurance more acceptable. Accepta-
bility is evidently being brought about in two ways. One is the type of advertisement
put out by Johnson & Higgins, a Wall Street insurance broker, which stresses the
possibilities of astronomical liability for officers and directors: a picture of a board
of directors, meeting around a table, with a duck at the head, is captioned, "Are you
a sitting duck?" Wall Street Journal, Mar. 21, 1968, at 6, cols. 4-6. After all, adver-
tising needs gimmicks and the one being used is "doubt." Jarman Interview, supra.
The other way to make the policy more acceptable is to make it clear what the
policy covers; the policy is going through numerous changes in wording and Mr.
Jarman feels that as more people take it out, the insurance companies will be better
able to understand their needs. The American Bar Association is also working to
improve the wording; through an Ad Hoc Committee on Indemnification Insurance
they are trying to work out a clearer policy by means of "closed door" negotiations
with Lloyd's. While this committee has been to London, and will probably go again,
they are not certain that anything will be accomplished. Interview with Joseph Hinsey,
Esq., Member, Ad Hoc Committee on Indemnification Insurance, in New York City,
July 22, 1968. They are not seeking to expand the coverage of the policy. Id. But
Stanley Wallace, Vice President of Johnson & Higgins, believes that the trend is to
full indemnity. Interview with Stanley Wallace, in New York City, July 22, 1968.
168 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
169 E. FoLKc, THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATIoN LAW 14.
170 Sec FoLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 94-96.
171 See Corroon Memorandum, supra note 123.
172 Letter from Ernest L. Folk, III, to Richard F. Corroon, December 20, 1966,
at 1 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
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ance] provides a fund which is separate and distinct from corporate
assets, from which indemnification can be provided. This avoids com-
pletely [sic] the problem inherent in having a corporation give back
to a director that which the director is ordered in a judgment to pay
to the corporation." '
Arsht gives a more palatable rationale for allowing the corpora-
tion to pay for insurance covering liabilities for which it could not
directly indemnify: "This is not, in the Revision Committee's judg-
ment, inconsistent with the policy embodied in the statute. It merely
recognizes that to the extent an executive or the corporation may be
able to obtain such insurance for the executive's benefit, the corporation
may make the premium payments, if it so desires, as a part of his
compensation." 174 Sebring, in discussing indemnification insurance,
goes even further: "I am perhaps a little unsophisticated on this line,
but I feel from my observations that by and large most officer-directors
are conscientious men. They are not deterred and they do not need
a deterrent through fear of civil liability." "7 But how can Arsht
differentiate between money returned by an insurance company and
money returned directly by the corporation? Both could be called "a
part of his compensation"; both would be a "subversion of fiduciary
enforcement." 176 And how can Sebring reconcile this statement with
his earlier one that indemnification of settlement payments "would
nullify the derivative action to a large degree ?" "
Perhaps even stranger is the statement of Henry Canby that such
insurance "may give rise to questions of public policy." 17 But what
is legislation, if it is not a definition of public policy? How can there
be a question of public policy, when the statute says that the corpora-
tion may insure against liabilities for which it has no power to indem-
nify directly? Perhaps Canby's statement demonstrates an under-
standing that the Commission may not have protected the public
interest, and that in Delaware, the legislature just does not care. The
legislature's stamp of approval is only a procedural technicality; it is
up to the courts, if they can, to impose some conception of public policy.
If they do not strike down insurance against liability in derivative
actions, corporate management will have achieved the result it de-
sired-but could not get-in subdivision (b).
But all the questions raised-proper judicial construction of the
statute, mental standards for deserving indemnification, procedure for
making such awards-may be almost academic. For there is no pro-
173 Letter to Richard A. Nielsen, January 13, 1967 (on file in offices of Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
174 Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 107, at 80.
175 Sebring, supra note 108, at 130 (emphasis added).
170 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
177 See text accompanying note 144 slpra.
178 Canby, Delaware's New Corporation Law, 39 PA. B.A.Q. 380, 385 (1968).
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vision that requires that indemnification be disclosed, nor was any ever
considered.' 79 Professor Folk stated that he was worried that the "non-
exclusive" clause would lead to undiscovered "under the table" indem-
nification; but he had to admit that "over the table" indemnification
was also likely to be undiscovered."" Professor Bishop, after noting
that none of the SEC's present rules require such disclosure, writes:
"For quite a while to come, my guess is that the case in which a stock-
holder finds out about and litigates indemnification which he thinks
is improper is going to be fairly rare." "81 Perhaps this explains why
in the twenty-four years that section 122(10) was in effect, only five
suits arose under it."~ The only case that Corroon knew of in which
the court ordered disclosure of the amount indemnified was the
Chrysler litigation.'" So not only has management received the very
favorable indemnification provision it desired, it has also kept at a
minimum the risk that indemnification will ever be challenged in court.
In light of this lack of disclosure, it may be somewhat surprising
to turn to section 220(b), which provides that "[a]ny stockholder
shall, upon written demand under oath stating the purpose
thereof, have the right . . . to inspect for any proper purpose the
corporation's . . . books and records." Professor Folk's draft of
this section would have limited inspection (1) to books and records
"of account," (2) by stockholders who either owned five per cent of
the outstanding stock or had been stockholders for at least six months.'8s
But Irving Morris, the plaintiff's lawyer on the Commission, opposed
the limitations,"s' and succeeded in having them deleted. The phrase
"books and records" should therefore be read rather broadly, and the
availability of information would turn on the shareholder's "proper
179 Corroon Interview, sitpra note 35. A general disclosure provision was con-
sidered and rejected. Id. General motors' by-law on indemnification provides for dis-
closure to shareholders (see General Motors Notice & Proxy Statement, supra note
115, at 40) ; according to Professor Bishop, it is the only one that does. See Bishop,
supra note 152, at 1079-80.
180 Folk Interview, supra note 27. In his Report, Folk wrote that preserving the
non-exclusive clause invites misuse "to the detriment of the shareholders who will
normally remain ignorant." FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 93.
181 Bishop, Indemnification of Corporate Directors, Officers and Employees, 20
Bus. LAw. 833, 844 (1965).
182 Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Sorenson v. Overland Corp.,
142. F. Supp. 354 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Mooney v. Willys-
Overland Motors, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 253 (D. Del. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir.
1953); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647
(1962) ; Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371,
164 A.2d 437 (1960) (according to Judge Seitz, this was the first case construing
§ 122(10) by a Delaware court).
183 Corroon Memorandum, supra note 123. Although the amount indemnified
the defendants may have been disclosed in court, the reported case only gives the
amounts that the plaintiffs' lawyers received. See Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 42 Del.
Ch. 508, 526, 215 A.2d 709, 719 (1965), aff'd, 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966).
184 See FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 173.
185 See Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Commission, April 19, 1965, at 2
(on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
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purpose." 186 In fact, Morris does not believe that the rest of the
Commission really knows what section 220 provides.8 1
What is instructive about section 220 is not so much the fact
that Morris seems to have slipped one by the Commission; rather, it is
the fact that Morris had no desire to slip anything stronger past.
According to Professor Folk, "the point of view of the plaintiff's lawyer
was excellently represented by Irving Morris." 188 But Irving Morris
operates very much within the system and was not about to ask for
radical change. He wrote that the law should be changed only if it
would help solidify "Delaware's position as a 'good' State in which to
incorporate" or if it would help corporate counsel to act with a sub-
stantial degree of certainty)' s To provide a broader shareholder right
to information, to help lift the veil of secrecy that covers so much of
a corporation's activities, 9 ' is not favored by Morris, who notes that
Delaware law has always provided that the directors run the company;
a broad information provision would run counter to its policy.',"
Two other features concerning shareholders deserve mention, for
on the surface they evidence some solicitude for the shareholder who
wishes to bring a derivative suit. One is the lack of a securities-for-
expenses statute; both Folk .92 and Morris .. agreed that no such
statute was necessary. Professor Bishop has written: "It might . .
occur to a cynical mind that this curious anomaly of the Delaware law
may not be wholly unconnected with the fact that the prosecution or
defense of a derivative suit in a Delaware court requires the retention
of Delaware counsel." "0' Mr. Morris agreed with this observation. A
securities-for-expenses statute never received any sort of favorable
response from the Commission because the lawyers do not want to dis-
courage litigation. Further, such a statute might have been interpreted
to allow the plaintiff to solicit other shareholders to join him. What
board of directors wants someone writing to their shareholders about
alleged wrongdoings? 19
Another provision of apparent benefit to shareholders is sequestra-
tion, which provides that a nonresident director's stock may be seized
to compel his appearance; if he fails to appear, the stock may be sold.'
In fact, the defendant need not have stock in the corporation involved
186 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
187 Morris Interview, supra note 22.
188 Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 2.
189 Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Commission, October 1, 1964, at 2
(on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware).
19 0 See note 249 infra and accompanying text.
191 Morris Interview, supra note 22.
192 See FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 103-107.
193 See Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Commission, sopra note 189, at 2.
194 Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92, 94-95 (1966).
195 Morris Interview, supra note 22.
196 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1953).
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in the suit; in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,1 7 the Court of
Chancery ordered the seizure of Ernest Breech's Ford stock, despite
the fact that Ford had no connection with the litigation. This sounds
like strong medicine and there was a spirited fight over retention of
the provision.
Irving Morris wrote to Chief Justice Southerland: "I strongly
favor the retention of our sequestration procedure as we presently have
it. . .. Without sequestration the procedural problems might well
prove to be insurmountable in bringing to account those who would
violate the trust placed in them by stockholders." 18 Professor Folk
wrote in his Report that "[r]epealing sequestration will likely weaken
remedies for effective enforcement of fiduciary duties, especially if the
revisions liberalize aspects of Delaware corporate practice." 'l At the
thirty-first meeting of the Commission, "[t]he Secretary of State re-
ported that many complaints from respected law firms outside Delaware
have been received by his office regarding the current state of the
sequestration law." 200 At the thirty-second meeting, Mr. Jervis, of
the Corporation Trust Company, "reported that many of the corpora-
tions which his company serves had complained about the Delaware
sequestration statute and he stated that, in his opinion, Delaware has
lost prospective corporations because of the statute." 201 At the thirty-
third meeting, Mr. Jackman, President of the United States Cor-
poration Company, joined Jervis in asserting that corporations were
fearful of sequestration. 2 Could it be that directors and officers would
prefer not to be forced to chance liabliity in litigation? Of course not.
At the thirty-second meeting, "Mr. Arsht stated that he had discussed
the problem with numerous members of the New York Bar and all
had said they saw no great objection to the Delaware practice since
they felt Delaware was a more favorable forum than any other
available." 203
The final vote was five in favor of retaining sequestration, and
four in favor of abolishing it (the Chairman, Chief Justice Southerland,
10740 Del. Ch. 523, 185 A.2d 762 (1962).
198 Letter from Irving Morris to Honorable Clarence A. Southerland, April 15,
1966, at 1 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wilmington,
Delaware).
190 FOLK REPORT, supra note 69, at 265.
200 Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 31st meeting,
March 31, 1966, at 4 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wil-
mington, Delaware).
201 Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 32d meeting,
April 15, 1966, at 1 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell; Wil-
mington, Delaware).
202 See Minutes of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission, 33d
meeting, April 25, 1966, at 2-3 (on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell;
Wilmington, Delaware). Mr. Jackman maintains that he knows of corporations
that had decided not to go to Delaware solely because of sequestration, but he would
not name names. Jackman Interview, supra note 32.
203 Minutes 4/15/66, supra note 201, at 2 (emphasis added).
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did not vote). Dukes and Storey, representing the State, Jackman
and Jervis, representing the corporation service companies, voted for
abolition; the five practicing lawyers voted for retention." 4 It is easy
to understand why the State and the corporation service companies
came out as they did-for both, their position would mean more clients
and more money. But why did the corporate lawyers join Morris in
protecting the shareholders? Because for all of them, retention of
sequestration means more money.
It must first be understood that the controversy was not one of
a "long-arm" statute versus sequestration. Not even Morris wanted
a long-arm statute. 05 Secretary of State Dukes pointed out that such
a statute would be a red flag to corporations saying "don't come
here." 200 A long-arm statute cannot be evaded, but sequestration-that
marvellous remedy for "bringing to account those who would violate
the trust placed in them by stockholders"-can be defeated by non-
ownership or concealment of shares. 2 7 Nevertheless, it is a fairly
effective way to insure that litigation will be centered in Delaware.
It might frighten away some corporations, and it may not reach every
defendant, but its abolition would mean that litigation in Delaware
courts would decrease, causing Delaware's corporate bar to suffer
financially. Professor Folk felt that abolition would attract enough
corporations to make up for this lost business2 8 The lawyers on the
Commission evidently disagreed; both Morris "' and Corroon 2 10 freely
admitted that they voted for retaining sequestration because it means
more business for them.
IV. THE PRODUCT: SUCCESS AND IMITATION
We now have some idea of what the product contains; how well
is it selling? The New York Times reports: "Delaware began charter-
ing new companies at a record-breaking clip after it revised and
liberalized its corporation laws to meet modern needs [sic]. Before
the revisions were made in July, 1967, Delaware was signing up new
204 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
205 Morris Interview, su ra note 22.
206 Corroon Interview, supra note 35.
207 See FoLK REmoT, supra note 69, at 269. Concealment can be accomplished
by putting shares in street name. Folk Interview, supra note 26. See DEL. CH. CT. R.
4(dd) (1) (b).
208 Folk Interview, supra note 26.
209 Morris Interview, supra note 22.
210 Corroon Interview, supra note 35. Corroon had proposed an amendment to
§ 366 that would have avoided the "Breech situation" (see text accompanying note 197
supra), by providing that "the only property of a nonresident defendant which may
be seized . . .shall be shares of . . .the corporation . . .by or for whose benefit
the action is brought." (Undated draft; on file in offices of Morris, Nichols, Arsht
& Tunnell; Wilmington, Delaware). Corroon felt that there was an enormous lack of
enthusiasm for the proposal. Corroon Interview, supra note 35. Jackman, however,
stated that he would have liked such a compromise. Jackman Interview, supra
note 32.
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corporations at an average of about 300 a month. . . . [It is now]
chartering new corporations at a record rate of 800 a month . . . . " 2
It notes that 56,000 corporations are chartered in Delaware, including
more than one third of the companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and almost half of the nation's one hundred largest industrial
concerns. 12 Such corporations as North American Rockwell, Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph, Lorrilard213 and United States
Steel (in anticipation 214) have come over. The article ends: "Mr.
Dukes said the franchise tax will bring the state about $21-million in
the fiscal year ending June 30." 215 In our free enterprise economy, the
success of an improved product will force competitors to redesign their
own wares. Corporation law is no exception. For example, Tennessee
in 1968 adopted an approximation of the 15% merger provision as well
as the provision eliminating appraisal rights where the stock is traded
on a national securities exchange.21  California " and Georgia 213 both
moved in 1968 to authorize indemnification insurance. Ohio in 1968
changed its indemnification provision, which was a copy of Delaware's
section 122(10),219 to one that is basically the same as section 145.22o
Virginia's 1968 revision of its indemnification provision omits the
211 N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1969, § 1 (News), at 57, col. 1.
212 Id.
213 See id. cols. 1-2.
214 United States Steel "moved" on January 1, 1966. In its notice to shareholders,
the following reasons were given for moving to Delaware:
In 1901 the Corporation was incorporated in the State of New Jersey
as the laws of that State were then deemed to be well adapted for the conduct
of its business. In the intervening years, the General Corporation Law of
Delaware has developed, affording a flexible and modern basis for corporate
action. Because of the fact that some 44,000 corporations (including 42 of
the 100 largest industrial corporations ranked according to sales) are incorpo-
rated in Delaware, there is a substantial body of case law, decided by a
judiciary of corporate specialists, interpreting the Delaware law in the corpo-
rate field. In addition, there are state tax advantages in having a corporate
domicile in Delaware rather than in New Jersey and it is expected that over
a period of years the tax savings may be substantial.
United States Steel Corp., Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders and Proxy
Statement, Nov. 24, 1965, at 5-6 (on file at the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C.). The move from New Jersey cost U.S. Steel about "a couple of
hundred thousand dollars," but they expect to save about $100,000 per year in taxes.
Interview with Richard M. Hays, Esq., United States Steel Corporation, in New
York City, July 22, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Hays Interview]. Their Delaware
counsel, is, by the way, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell. See note 29 supra and
accompanying text.
215 N.Y. Times, supra note 212, at col. 3.
216 See TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 48, §§ 48-908, -909(b) (3) (Supp. 1968). Their
new indemnification provision, on the other hand, followed New York, rather than
Delaware. See id. §§ 48-407 to -411.
217 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(h) (West 1968).
218 See GA. CODE AxN. tit. 22, § 22-202(16) (1968).
219 See Law of June 14, 1955, v. 126 [1955] Laws of Ohio 440-41 (repealed 1967).
220 The main difference is that "not opposed to" is not included. See OHio REv.
ConE ANN. tit. 17, § 1701, 13(E) (Supp. 1968).
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phrase "no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful," and
its nonexclusivity clause does not apply to "gross negligence" or "wil-
ful misconduct"; otherwise, it is very similar to section 145.221 Penn-
sylvania wasted less time than most; with stunning originality, they
had an exact copy of Delaware's section 145 passed by November 30,
1967.222 They did, however, make one addition. Evidently reflecting
Henry Canby's fear that insuring against liability in derivative suits
might give rise to questions of public policy,223 the Pennsylvania legis-
lature added one sentence to subdivision (g) : "Such insurance is de-
clared to be consistent with the public policy of this Commonwealth."
It is New Jersey, however, which seems to have made the most
concerted effort to meet the competition. In a preface to their revision,
the New Jersey Corporation Law Revision Commission noted that
since World War I, the trend has been to Delaware incorporation and
that New Jersey had fallen farther behind in "modernizing" their
corporation law.22 4  They added: "The Commission trusts that this
trend will now be reversed, in light of the revision of the New Jersey
corporation laws herewith submitted." 22 To make sure that cor-
porations will get the message, the preface advertises-"New Law
Enabling, Not Restrictive"-and notes the Commission's belief that
New Jersey has pursued the policy of "flexible and permissive" cor-
poration laws "perhaps further than any other state." 226
New Jersey actually began its revision in 1958, when the Cor-
poration Law Revision Commission was established by statute 2 7 but
a "Preliminary Draft" was not completed until October, 1967.228 It
would appear that the commission was not spurred to activity until
New Jersey lost its old customer, United States Steel, to Delaware in
1966.22 After the 1967 draft was prepared, significant changes were
made to reflect the Delaware statute. For example, the indemnification
provision. In the Commissioners' Comments to the first draft, it was
stated that "indemnification may not be available where liability arises
under Federal law." 20 This frightening statement is omitted from the
221 See VA. CODE ANN. tit. 13.1, § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
222 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410 (Supp. 1967).
223 See text accompanying note 178 supra.
224 The situation has come full circle. See text accompanying notes 10 & 17 supra.
225 N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A, at X (1969).
2 2
6 Id. XI.
227 Law of April 16, 1958, v. 1, c. 10, [1958] Laws of New Jersey 30-32.
228 This was not actually the first draft. Interview with Alan Lowenstein, Esq.,
Chairman, New Jersey Corporation Law Revision Commission, in Newark, N.J.,
July 18, 1968. There is, however, no reference made by the Commission to a prior
complete draft.
229 See note 214 szspra and accompanying text.
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Comment accompanying the new provision, 3' which includes the phrase
"not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." '32 The rest of
the indemnification provision, although worded slightly differently than
Delaware's, provides the same benefits. 3 Likewise, the statute au-
thorizes loans to officers, as Delaware does, 3 makes more explicit than
Delaware the range of financial benefits the corporation can bestow on
officers and directors," and adopted, after the Preliminary Draft, the
15%o merger provision =6 and the elimination of appraisal rights where
the security is traded on a national securities exchange.
2 7
While this may show that other states are attempting to compete
with Delaware,""8 it is doubtful that the competition can ever catch up.
Delaware is selling well for a number of different reasons and it is
difficult to single out the one most important to management. Of
course, the substantive provisions of the statute are attractive; so, too,
is the tax structure, which does not include a corporation income tax
on companies not doing business in Delaware. 9 The court system is
also very important. Professor Folk writes that the Court of Chancery,
the trial court in corporate matters, has a very high level of competence.
It has been shaped by "outstanding" and "unusually competent" judges,
many of its decisions are never appealed, and the quality of its "logic
and thinking considerably exceeds what is found in most state courts
and many federal tribunals." Thus "[c]orporations believe that they
are getting a fair shake in Delaware even if a decision is adverse." 240
Arsht notes that corporate counsel consider Delaware to be a more
favorable forum than any other available; 2 ' Jackman believes that the
courts are very favorable to corporations.' Whether or not this is so
it is important that people such as the president of a corporation service
231 See Memorandum of July 12, 1968 (on file in offices of Lowenstein, Sandler,
Brochin & Kohl; Newark, New Jersey).232 See N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A: 3-5(2) (1969). In light of this bit of "legislative
history," it is interesting to note the following statement: "The Commission sees no
benefit in referring to the Preliminary Draft and Comments in future statutory
construction." Id. XVI.
=
3 See id. § 14A: 3-5.234 See id. at § 14A: 6-11 ; text accompanying note 101 supra.
235 For example, it specifically permits furnishing of education, housing, social
and recreational services "and other similar aids and services" to directors, officers,
and their families. N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A: 3-1(1) (1) (1969). See text accompanying
note 100 supra.
2 36See N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A: 10-3(4) (1969).
237 Specifically including over-the-counter markets. See id. § 14A: 11-1.2 3 8 Jackman felt that New Jersey is definitely attempting to compete with
Delaware. Jackman Interview, supra note 32.
2 0 See N.Y. Times, supra note 206, at cols. 2-3; cf. E. FOLK, THE RED BoorK
DIGEST OF THE NEW DELAW.RE CoaR,1oATIoN LAW--1967 iv (1968) (numbers 1 and 2
on list of "advantages of the Delaware law"). United States Steel felt that New
Jersey's problems, and therefore its future tax needs, were far greater than Delaware's
and this factor influenced them in moving to Delaware. Hays Interview, supra
note 214.
240 Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 2-3.
241 See text accompanying note 203 supra.
242 Jackman Interview, supra note 32.
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company believe the courts to be favorable. Another point, mentioned
by Folk, 4' Jackman 4 and Dukes, 45 is the large body of precedent
that has been built up since 1899-lawyers know what they are getting
into. This leads to what Professor Folk calls the "snowball effect":
"Many corporations have come into the state. Many problems have
been satisfactorily litigated. . . . More corporations come in, more
decisions are rendered, and the statute is brought up to date to meet
contemporary corpus needs. A pro-Delaware sentiment grows and
grows. Large corporations begin to switch from other states to
Delaware. Other corporations begin to inquire why they are doing
this and consider why they should not do the same." 246 All of these
factors get mixed together and create that psychological feeling of a
"favorable climate for corporations." This climate is hard to duplicate
and it makes Delaware the leading seller in its field.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has discussed above how Delaware produced its
new corporation law, as well as some features of the finished product.
More difficult is an evaluation of the consequences of the process de-
scribed. Some idea is required of what corporation law should seek
to accomplish, for it is possible that Delaware is operating properly and
the only ill effect of its actions is an unseemly deviation from demo-
cratic theory.
The first question is whether corporation law should attempt any-
thing more than to assure that corporations donate some portion of
their wealth to the various states. Does the concept of a corporate
charter as a "contract" with the state become meaningless as cor-
poration statutes become increasingly liberal? The answer may be
"yes," but even if the charter has become meaningless, the reasons for
chartering may remain. Economic units need some amount of regu-
lation, since market forces alone will not insure social good, and the
charter is one device that has traditionally been used to provide some
of this regulation. The device can be used in many ways; if corporation
law no longer provides limits on corporate size, antitrust law can fill the
gap. The charter is merely a convenient way to give a "corporation"
some form, thereby regulating some of its activities, and we could
probably get along without charters, using other types of laws to
provide whatever regulation may be necessary.
But so long as charters are being used, and there is a corporation
law which goes with them, they will give some form and direction to
the organization of the economic unit called a corporation. The
present conception is of a three-way ordering between shareholders,
243 See Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 3.
244 Jackman Interview, supra note 32.
245 See N.Y. Times, supra note 212, at col. 1.
246 Folk Letter, supra note 52, at 3.
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management and the state.24 7 Shareholders have certain property rights
in their corporation; they select their managers who are given some
degree of decision-making power, and the state provides some regu-
lation to safeguard the public interest.
In this three-way arrangement it is not difficult to see which group
has the most power. Shareholders may have the right to vote, and
can sue for breaches of fiduciary duty, but they have no easy access to
all the relevant information needed to make an informed decision.
They may wish to know whether high executives are using expense
accounts improperly, but they cannot find out.248 Shareholders will not
even be able to force their corporation to give a divisional accounting,
so as to uncover unprofitable divisions, and hence management errors,
which get submerged in a general financial report." 9 Traditional
shareholder rights-to maintain control over growth by acquisition,2
50
to retain proportional ownership, 5 to receive accrued dividends on
preferred stock2 _are rapidly disappearing. State control in the
"public interest" has atrophied to the point where even minimum
capitalization is no longer required. Management's power has in-
creased; the indemnification provision shows it to have increased at
the expense of the public and shareholder.
It is not strange that management's power is increasing, while the
state's and the shareholders' decreases. The strange thing is that the
rhetoric lingers on. The three-party ordering underlying corporation
law no longer reflects economic realities. Economic concentration is
increasing rapidly, particularly with the growth of conglomerates. The
power of the vote becomes diluted because ownership is spread over a
diffuse group,21 which is usually apathetic. 5  Even if an individual
247 Cf. A. BERL & G. MEANS, supra note 125, at 129-34.
248 Ralph Nader submitted a list of "shareholder" questions to General Motors,
one of which requested a detailed listing of expense account items of higher executives.
General Motors' response, which "viewed them as labeled-i.e. as 'shareholder' ques-
tions," was: "General Motors must respectfully decline to submit such a list. Super-
vision and auditing of executives' expense accounts is a management responsibility."
Hearings, supra note 115, at 741, 748. It is possible, however, that a shareholder could
compel G.M. by suit to open its books on this matter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220
(Supp. 1968) ; text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.
2
49 See Hearings, supra note 121, at 430.
250 See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
'I See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (3) (Supp. 1968).
22 See id. § 242(a) (4).
253 A 1951 study showed that slightly over two thirds of the owners of common
stock owned less than 100 shares, approximately 98% owned less than 200 shares, and
that the median shareholder holds considerably less than 100 shares. The 98% who
own less than 200 shares hold 42% of the outstanding common stock. L. Kimaui-,
SHARE OWNERSHIP IN THE UNrrI STATES 43 (1952). General Motors reported that
in 1967, 42.7% of the shareholders owned 25 shares or less, 79% owned 100 shares or
less, 10.3% owned 101 to 200 shares, and 10.7% owned 201 shares or more. See
Nader, General Motors Corp.: Distribution of Ownership and Ability of Management
to Gain Overwhelming Proxy Support for Position It Urges, in Hearings, stpra
note 121, at 106.
.254See, e.g., J. LNGsTo , THE AmERcAN STOCKHOLDER 26 (1958); Glenn,
A Study and A Suggestion, 4 VA. LAW WEEKLY DIcrA 124-25 (1953).
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shareholder wishes to take an active interest in the financial affairs of
his corporation, he may not be able to understand balance sheets which
confuse professional analysts. 55  The easiest thing for an unhappy
shareholder to do is sell his stock and put his investment elsewhere.
250
Further aiding the divorce of ownership and control are the financial
intermediaries who are themselves managers.2 57  These institutional
investors, by not using their power, assist in insulating management
from control.25s Faced with these economic realities, it is no wonder
that draftsmen of corporation laws choose to whittle away shareholder
rights, rather than attempt to bolster them.25 9
Economic realities pressuring states to give up hope for regulation
in the public interest have already been noted. 6 ' Another factor aiding
state abdication may very well be federal legislation. If the Securities
Acts are designed to protect investors, why should the states worry?
But the process of federal intervention may accelerate as the states
liberalize their corporation laws, or attempt to nullify the effect of
federal law in areas such as indemnification of insider trading. The
growth of "Federal Corporation Law" is no accident.
Delaware corporation law is not holding back these economic
realities, and it may be accelerating them.26  Provisions that make
mergers easier do not hinder economic concentration; provisions in-
tended to insulate management from financial liability will not reverse
the trend toward uncontrolled management. None of this answers the
question of what corporation law should do, although it does demon-
strate some of the consequences of Delaware's corporation law. Cor-
porate chartering considered as a method of economic regulation could,
of course, do many things. The states could reassert themselves. They
25 See Stabler, The Conglomerates-Even Accountants Find Some Financial
Reports of Combines Baffling, in Hearings, supra note 121, at 431.
256 Some have attempted to call a stockholder's shift of investment a "vote" (see,
e.g., Glenn, supra note 254, at 125), but it is doubtful that the analogy is apt, since
a shareholder rarely sells for the purpose of influencing future policies of his
ex-company.
257
It is a fair estimate that over a third of the shares of our largest industrial
corporations are owned by financial intermediaries such as insurance com-
panies, banks, trust departments, savings and loan associations, and mutual
funds.... The individual who buys an insurance policy or is covered by a
pension fund, or in other ways contributes to the swelling accumulations of
the financial institutions, does not even have the paper rights to a voice in
management that corporate shareholders have.
Harbrecht, The Modern Corporation Revisited, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1410, 1413-14
(1964).
2585ee A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 55-56 (1959).
2Z9 "So through various statutory changes . . . the stockholders' position, once a
controlling factor in the running of the enterprise, has declined from extreme strength
to practical impotence. The legal changes probably have merely recognized the
underlying economic fact." A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 141 (1933).
260 See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
261 See A. BERLE, supra note 258, at 77.
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have long since realized that the desire for profit does not justify
deceiving shareholders with watered stock. Why should the desire
for profit justify environmental pollution, unsafe products, unsafe work-
ing conditions, or deceiving consumers?
But why bother with corporation law? Such a law could not
remedy all these abuses; specific legislation may be preferable. Never-
theless, the structure that a corporation law provides may make reform
easier. At least, the structure should not make it more difficult. The
three-way ordering conception of corporation law gives direction to
corporate structure by establishing decision-making power and checks
on that power202 If we wish to solve the problems caused by corporate
power, a logical place to start would be inside the corporation. Share-
holder rights should be recognized as being of limited value in checking
management in today's large corporations, but they should not, there-
fore, be dispensed with. Perhaps, provision should be made for one
director to be nominated by shareholders, or mandatory cumulative
voting. But whatever the proposal, we should not expect too much
from shareholder control; shareholder participation in the largest cor-
porations will probably continue to be virtually meaningless.2 3 Cor-
poration law will have to find other means to check management, and
leave behind the illusory theory of shareholder control.
The most obvious way is for the state to reassert itself in limiting
corporate power. Even within corporation law as presently written,
a start could be made by changing certain provisions that hinder efforts
to control economic power. For example, interested-director trans-
actions could be made void, or at least held to a high standard, thus
removing one incentive for interlocking directorates .2" The state
could hold indemnification to narrowly defined areas. It could require
a more adequate supply of information, aiding shareholders and the
state in uncovering abuses. For example, detailed reporting of in-
dustrial technology and costs relating to environmental pollution might
be required. What are oil companies doing to avoid drilling disasters
at sea? What resources are automobile manufacturers putting into the
development of alternatives to the internal combustion engine? What
research are mining companies doing to prevent-or cure-black lung
disease? To control inflation, we might require more detailed account-
ing of costs in key industries. If the government were certain that
direct and indirect labor costs of a medium priced car amount to only
$300,2105 it could better evaluate what type of price rise automobile
262 "The law of corporations ... might well be considered as a potential consti-
tutional law for the new economic state .... " A. BERLE & G. MEANs, supra note
259, at 357.
2 63 See note 121 supra.
2
G
4 See DEL. CODE ANx. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1968). For a breakdown of the
interlocks on General Motors' Board of Directors, see Nader, General Motors Corpo-
ration: Outside Directorships, in Hearings, supra note 121, at 54648.265 See Testimony of Ralph Nader, Hearings, supra note 121, at 267-68. Nader
supported his allegation with a unit-cost analysis for one month's production at one
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manufacturers should be permitted after signing new labor contracts.
More explicit information on these types of problems may enable us to
decide whether a problem is being adequately dealt with by corporations,
or whether other action is necessary.
It should be obvious that the government to do this must be the
federal government. The position of the states will not change. There
is no reason to think that Delaware will go out of business, or that if
it did, no other state would seek to take over the business. There are
other reasons for preferring the federal government. The largest cor-
porations are not restricted to any one state, nor are the problems they
cause so restricted. If corporation law becomes a means for generating
information, the solutions will have to be sought through federal legis-
lation or federal administrative action. One could hardly imagine
Delaware subjecting General Motors to the close scrutiny that such
information provisions would necessitate. Federal legislation would
also provide a single forum to attract, and hear, all interest groups.
Democratic theory would appear to call for this approach. The job
of writing a national law is not something usually assigned to one
small state.
A system of federal chartering and corporation law is not a new
idea,"' 6 and it will not cure all ills. It may end up by looking almost
exactly like Delaware's, but it need not. It could apply to only the
largest corporations, dealing with their effects in ways that may not be
appropriate for smaller corporations.6 7 It could be used in some of
the ways suggested above, providing the logical starting point for
intelligent control of corporate power. It could make the American
public feel that large corporations are not totally beyond their control.
The legal tool is there. It is up to Congress to use it.
automobile assembly plant of the Ford Motor Co. See Hearings, s.rpra, note 121,
at 277-330. Senator Nelson termed the data "strong evidence," adding that the $300
figure "looks a bit high." Id. 275.
26For a brief history of proposals for national chartering, see Reuschlein,
Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform It a National Economy, 91 U. PA.
L. Ray. 91, 106-07 (1942).
267 See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
